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I. INTRODUCTION
FROM THE inception of federal and state taxing systems until the
mid-1980's, nonprofit hospitals enjoyed virtually unquestioned
exemption from federal and state income and property taxes as
"charitable" institutions. I Over the past few years, however, the
tax-exempt status of nonprofit hospitals has come under increasing
scrutiny by both federal and state governments. At the state level,
this trend can be traced to a landmark decision by the Utah
Supreme Court in 1985 that upheld the denial of an exemption to
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A. 1978, J.D. University of
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tt Professor of Law, Arizona State University. Robert Wood Johnson Faculty Fellow
in Health Care Finance, Johns Hopkins University. J.D. 1981, University of Chicago.
1. Federal law has provided for an exemption from income tax for charitable organiza-
tions virtually since the inception of the income tax. See Boris I. Bittker & George K.
Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE
L.J. 299, 301 (1976); Kenneth Liles & Cynthia Blum, Development of the Federal Tax Treat-
ment of Charities, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 6 (Autumn 1975).
Administrative rulings relating to the charitable status of hospitals date back at least to
1928. I.T. 2421, VII-2 C.B. 150 (1928); Douglas M. Mancino, Income Tax Exemption of the
Contemporary Nonprofit Hospital, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1015, 1016-17, 1038-39 (1988). State
law property tax exemptions for charitable organizations have existed since colonial times.
Id. at 1016 n.1.
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two nonprofit hospitals primarily on the grounds that they failed to
provide sufficient charity care.2 At the federal level, warning sig-
nals began with the repeal of tax exemption for Blue Cross/Blue
Shield insurance in the 1986 Tax Reform Act,3 continued in hear-
ings on the unrelated business income tax (UBIT) held in 1987-88,1
and most recently have surfaced in the form of two separate legisla-
tive proposals that would impose more stringent standards for tax
exemption of nonprofit hospitals.5 In addition, the Internal Reve-
nue Service (IRS) recently announced a "crackdown" on exemption
through more stringent interpretation and enforcement of existing
standards.6
The primary purpose of this article is to assess the potential im-
pact of the proposed federal legislation on the tax exemption of non-
profit hospitals and other health care providers. Part II reviews
federal and state exemption standards currently in force. Part III
summarizes and critiques each of the new federal legislative propos-
2. Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985Xsplit
decision upholding county equalization board's revocation of exempt status for two nonprofit
hospitals primarily due to the hospital's lack of charity care). The majority first recounted
the historical shift in the mission of nonprofit hospitals from treating the poor to treating the
community at large on a fee for service basis as a prelude to reexamining the issue of exemp-
tion for nonprofit hospitals. Id. at 270-72. The majority then noted that the hospitals in
question derived virtually all their operating revenues from patient charges, committed less
than one percent of their gross revenues to charity care, and charged patients prevailing
market rates. Id. at 273-74. According to the majority, the hospitals "confuse[d] the element
of gift to the community, which an entity must demonstrate in order to qualify as a charity
under our Constitution, with the concept of community benefit, which any of countless pri-
vate enterprises might provide." Id. at 276. The majority also placed weight on the fact that
the hospitals did not demonstrate any reliance on donations and gifts for their operations. Id.
at 273.
3. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514 § 1012(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2390-94
(1986)(enacting I.R.C. § 501(m) prohibiting exemption for an entity providing "commercial-
type insurance").
4. Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1987).
5. These two efforts are H.R. 790, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Roybal
Bill] and H.R. 1374, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Donnelly Bill]. See infra Part
III for a full discussion of both bills.
6. See For EO's, Topics Include Audits, Hospitals, and Lobbying, 51 TAX NorEs 963
(May 27, 1991Xquoting John Burke, IRS assistant commissioner, as warning of more
"profound and penetrating" audits of hospitals). See also Hospitals' Rx for Exempt Status:
Medicare and Emergency Access, 51 TAX NoTEs 415 (April 29, 1991) (quoting James J.
McGovern, IRS Associate Chief Counsel for Employee Benefits-Exempt Organizations, as
insisting that an open emergency room and treatment of Medicare patients are virtual re-
quirements for exemption under the IRS's 1969 revenue ruling discussed infra at notes 10-13
and accompanying text); Ron Winslow, IRS Reviews Non Profit Hospitals for Abuses of Tax
Exempt Status, WALL ST. J., April 3, 1992 at B1 (noting publication of extensive audit guide-
lines for IRS agents examining nonprofit hospitals).
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als. Part IV then offers some overall commentary on the proposed
approaches to revising tax-exemption standards and some thoughts
on the future of tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals and other
health-care providers.
II. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL AND STATE EXEMPTION
STANDARDS
A. Federal Law
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) ex-
empts from income taxation "[c]orporations... organized and op-
erated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, . . . or
educational purposes ....",7 Although neither hospitals nor health
care services are enumerated as exempt activities, the Internal Rev-
enue Service (IRS or Service) has long recognized that a hospital
will be exempt if it meets the general requirements of "charitable"
status."
Prior to 1969, the position of the IRS regarding the tax exemp-
tion of nonprofit hospitals reflected traditional notions that "char-
ity" involved helping the poor. Thus in a 1956 ruling, the Service
stated that in order to be exempt, a hospital must "be operated to
the extent of its financial ability for those not able to pay for services
rendered . . . ."9 In 1969, however, the IRS altered its "charity
7. Although the statutory language uses the term "exclusively" in defining exempt or-
ganizations, the Treasury Regulations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) make clear that "exclusively"
really means "primarily." Tax-exempt organizations often engage in a variety of activities
that are not themselves tax-exempt. As long as such activities relate to the exempt purpose of
the entity, however, or are "insubstantial," the entity generally will not lose exempt status.
"Unrelated" business activities, however, are subject to tax under the Unrelated Business
Income Tax contained in I.R.C. §§ 511-514. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-l(e); BRucE R.
HOPKINs, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEmPT ORGANIZATIONS 105 (5th ed. 1987); PAUL E.
TREUscH, TAx-EXEMPT CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 107-17 (3d ed. 1988); I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3).
The regulations further explain that the tests for charitable status contain both organiza-
tional and operational components. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(a). The organizational com-
ponent is met if the organizing documents of the entity both limit the entity's purposes to one
or more exempt activities and do not expressly permit the entity to engage in activities that do
not further the exempt purpose. Treas. reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(lXi). The operational test
simply requires that the entity actually pursue its exempt purposes. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(e). In addition, the statute provides that in order to be exempt, no part of the
net earnings of the entity can inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, and
the entity must not engage in substantial lobbying activity or any political campaign activity.
Id.
8. See supra note 1.
9. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202. The ruling recognized that free care was not the
only measure of charity, but explicitly cautioned that a hospital that operates with the expec-
tation of full payment from all patients does not dispense charity merely because it has bad
1992]
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care" standard for hospital exemption in response to hospital indus-
try concerns that Medicare, Medicaid and other social programs
had rendered this standard anachronistic. 10 Adopting the broader
view of the law of charitable trusts, the IRS in its 1969 ruling stated
that a hospital pursues an exempt purpose as long as it is engaged in
the "promotion of health" for the benefit of the general community,
even though a portion of that community, such as indigents, are
excluded from participation. 1 The IRS took the position that the
hospital's operation of an open emergency room, treatment of
Medicare and Medicaid patients, and maintenance of an open medi-
cal staff and an independent board of directors drawn from commu-
nity leaders established that the hospital served a broad enough
segment of the community to justify continued exemption.12 The
debts. Id. Nevertheless, as explained by the D.C. Circuit in Eastern Kentucky Welfare
Rights Ass'n v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1289-90 n.26 (1974), vacated on other grounds, 426
U.S. 26 (1976):
[HIospitals were required to provide free care only to the extent of their financial
ability. Hospitals operating at a deficit would have no obligation under Ruling 56-
185. In addition the Ruling qualified the "financial ability" standard by providing:
"[t]he fact that [a hospital's] charity record is relatively low is not conclusive that a
hospital is not operated for charitable purposes .... A nominal charity record for a
given period of time, in the absence of charitable demands of the community, will
not affect its right to continued exemption."
10. Tax Reform Act of 1969: Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1427 (1969) (statement of Julius M. Greisman, attorney, American Hospital
Association). See ANNE SOMERs, HOSPITAL REGULATION: THE DILEMMA OF PUBLIC POL-
icy 41 (1969) ("Thanks to Medicare, Medicaid, and numerous other public and private
mechanisms for financing care for the indigent and medically indigent, in a few years free
hospital care will approach the vanishing point."). For a critical history of Rev. Rul. 69-545,
see Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Tax Administration as Health Policy: Hospitals, the
Internal Revenue Service, and the Courts, 16 J. HEALTH POL, POL'Y & L. 251 (1991).
11. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
12. Id. Commentators have sometimes characterized the change in IRS position as an
adoption of the "community benefit" theory of charity, as opposed to the "quid-pro-quo" or
"relief of government burden" theory embodied in the charity care standard. The latter the-
ory posits that exemption is warranted because the exempt organization undertakes an activ-
ity - in this case, treatment of the poor - that otherwise would have to be paid for by
government. Thus, the exemption is really a quid-pro-quo for the hospital relieving the gov-
ernment of the burden of paying for health care for the poor. The community benefit theory,
on the other hand, posits that an activity can be charitable simply because it provides a
general benefit to the community, even if there is no specific government burden that is as-
sumed by the exempt entity. See, eg., Robert S. Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20
CATH. U. L. REv. 237, 238-40 (1970). For a thorough discussion of these and other theories
of exemption, see Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit
Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REv. 307, 332-87
(1991) [hereinafter Hall & Colombo I].
Public interest advocates challenged the validity of the 1969 ruling in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Ass'n v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
426 U.S. 26 (1976) (D.C. Circuit upheld the ruling on the merits, but the Supreme Court
vacated the opinion on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing).
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"promotion of health" standard for exemption was further en-
trenched by a 1983 ruling that specialized hospitals without an open
emergency room, such as cancer or ophthalmological hospitals,
may qualify for exemption by demonstrating that the hospital oper-
ates exclusively to benefit the community. 13
The current standard for exempting nonprofit hospitals at the
federal level, therefore, focuses on the health care services provided
to the community in which the hospital operates. If the hospital is
"promoting health" for the general benefit of the community, then
the hospital is pursuing a charitable purpose and should be exempt
provided other requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) are met.14 Nev-
ertheless, recent statements by IRS officials indicate that the agency
may be attempting to narrow the scope of the "promotion of
health" standard. For example, James J. McGovern, IRS Associate
Chief Counsel for Exempt Organizations, recently stated that the
IRS views an open emergency room and treatment of Medicaid
(low income) patients as virtual substantive requirements for ex-
emption of the typical acute care hospital, notwithstanding the fact
that these items were used simply as examples of the requisite
breadth of services needed to meet the "promotion of health" stan-
dard of Rev. Rul. 69-545.15 In any event, the federal standard
makes clear that charity care is not a requirement of exemption,
13. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94, 95.
14. See supra note 7 for a discussion of these other requirements.
15. Hospital Charity Care and Tax Exempt Status: Restoring the Commitment and Fair-
ness, Hearings Before the Select Committee on Aging, at 58 (1990) (Statement of James J.
McGovern, Associate Chief Counsel, IRS) [hereinafter Roybal Hearings]. See Hospitals Rx
for Exempt Status: Medicare and Emergency Access, 51 TAX NoTEs 415 (April 29, 1991).
Compare the actual language of Rev. Rul. 69-545:
[The promotion of health, like the relief of poverty and the advancement of educa-
tion and religion, is one of the purposes in the general law of charity that is deemed
beneficial to the community as a whole even though the class of beneficiaries eligible
to receive a direct benefit from its activities does not include all members of the
community, such as indigent members of the community, provided that the class is
not so small that its relief is not of benefit to the community. By operating an
emergency room open to all persons and by providing hospital care for all those
persons in the community able to pay the cost thereof either directly or through
third party reimbursement, [the hospital] is promoting the health of a class of per-
sons that is broad enough to benefit the community.
Rev. Rul. 69-545, supra note I 1 (citations omitted).
This language clearly uses the operation of the emergency room and treatment of all
patients able to pay as merely illustrative examples. The only firm substantive requirement of
the ruling is that the hospital in question serve a sufficiently broad class to provide a commu-
nity benefit. Moreover, in a later ruling, the IRS appeared to minimize the importance of the
open emergency room by holding that hospitals without emergency room operations could be
exempt if they nevertheless demonstrated other indicia of community benefit, such as treating
Medicare/Medicaid patients, having a board of directors drawn from the general community,
maintaining an open-staff policy, and the like. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
19921
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although operation of an open emergency room and acceptance of
underfunded Medicaid payments may be required for the typical
acute-care hospital.
With respect to non-hospital health care providers, federal ex-
emption standards are in open conflict. The IRS purports to have
extended the promotion of health standard to a variety of nonhos-
pital health care services, such as entities providing home health
care,16 and providing housing, transportation, and other services to
visiting family members of critically ill patients.17 In virtually all
these cases, however, the entity granted exemption was engaged in
at least some subsidization of services for patients unable to pay."'
The same "charity care" theme runs through the IRS standards for
exemption of nursing homes, which are prohibited from discharging
any patient whose insurance coverage runs out. 19 In contrast,
nonhospital health care services limited to paying patients generally
have been denied exemption, despite their undisputed promotion of
health and service to the entire paying community.20
16. Rev. Rul. 72-209, 1972-1 C.B. 148.
17. Rev. Rul. 81-28, 1981-1 C.B. 328. See also Rev. Rul. 79-358, 1979-2 C.B. 225 (ex-
emption to entity paying to upgrade hospital patients to a private room when medically
necessary).
18. In Rev. Rul. 72-209, 1972-1 C.B. 148, the entity in question was a "qualified home
health agency" under the Social Security Act, and received most of its payments for services
from Medicare. Surplus income was used in part to provide services to patients unable to pay
and in part to expand services. In Rev. Rul. 81-28, 1981-1 C.B. 328, modest housing and
transportation services were provided without charge to visitors of patients and the entity was
supported by donations. See also Rev. Rul. 79-358, supra note 17 (the entity provided private
hospital rooms where medically necessary to patients who otherwise could not afford such a
room).
19. Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145. However, nursing homes are not required to
accept uninsured patients at the outset. See generally, John D. Colombo, Are Associations of
Doctors Tax-Exempt? Analyzing Inconsistencies in the Tax Exemption of Health Care Provid-
ers, 9 VA. TAX REv. 469, 485-500 (1990).
20. In Federation Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 687 (1979), aff'd,
625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980), for example, the IRS denied exempt status to a nonprofit phar-
macy that sold drugs at cost to the elderly and handicapped. The Service based its denial on
the grounds that sales of drugs was ordinarily an activity carried on for profit, and thus was
not a charitable purpose. The Service conveniently ignored the fact that a pharmacy selling
drugs promotes health as much as a hospital providing health care equipment and services.
In a split decision, the Tax Court upheld the denial, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court decision. The IRS also has shown virulent hostility to exempting HMO's, associations
of doctors, and other entities providing or assisting health care services on a fee basis. See
Colombo, supra note 19, at 519-20. See also Geisinger Health Plan, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656
(1991) (IRS denial of tax exemption to HMO based on claim that HMO effectively limited
membership to healthy individuals overturned by tax court. HMO in question did not have
emergency room, did not treat Medicare patients or indigent to any substantial degree, but





While federal law concerns itself primarily with the income
tax,21 states often impose property and sales taxes as well. In all
states, statutory or constitutional provisions exempt "charitable"
entities from property and income taxes. Most states automatically
confer an income tax exemption on any entity exempt from federal
income tax under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), 2 although a few have in-
dependent statutory exemptions that are virtually identical in lan-
guage to the federal provision.23 Property tax exemptions exist by
virtue of independent state law provisions, but again uniformly pro-
vide for exemption for "charitable" entities.24 Sales tax exemptions
are more varied: a number of states exempt charitable entities from
paying sales tax on purchases,25 and a few states exempt charities
from charging sales tax to their customers.26
The majority of states, in applying their exemption provisions to
hospitals, adhere to the federal view that the "promotion of health"
for the benefit of the general community is a charitable activity, de-
spite the absence of substantial free or subsidized care for the
poor.27 These states, however, appear to suffer from the same inter-
pretation malady as their federal counterparts when nonhospital
health care services are at issue.23 Nevertheless, a small number of
21. Federal law also confers on exempt hospitals the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds,
I.R.C. §§ 141(e)(1)(G), 145, and to receive donations deductible from the federal estate and
gift tax, I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522.
22. See Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 323 n.53 for a list of state income tax
statutory provisions.
23. Id.
24. William R. Ginsberg, The Real Property Tax Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations
A Perspective, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 291, 292 (1980) (every state has a statute regarding property tax
exemption for charitable organizations, and all but seven have constitutional provisions); Hall
& Colombo I, supra note 12, at 324 n.55.
25. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 404 n.345.
26. Id. at 405 n.347.
27. Roger C. Nauert, et al., Hospitals Face Loss of Federal Tax-Exempt Status, 42
HEALTHCARE FiN. MGT. 48, 52 (Sept. 1988); Phelon S. Rammell & Robert S. Parsons, Utah
County v. Intermountain Health Care: Utah's Unique Method for Determining Charitable
Property Tax Exemption - A Review of Its Mandate and Impact, 22 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L.
73, 73-74 (1989); N. Keith Enge, Jr., Note, Nonprofit Hospitals and the State Tax Exemption:
An Analysis of the Issues Since Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 9 VA. TAX
REV. 599, 599 (1990). But see James B. Simpson & Sarah D. Strum, How Good a Samaritan?
Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable Hospitals Reconsidered, 14 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REv. 633 (1991). Based on cases over the past 50 years including many where the issue
was not in dispute, the authors conclude that "[i]n the majority of jurisdictions where the
question of free care has been raised in the hospital context, the provision of charity care and
the accessibility of the hospital to indigent patients continue to be determinative, or at least
important, criteria for entitlement to tax exemption." Id. at 647.
28. See Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 343 n.128; Phillip A. Rothermich, Note,
1992]
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states cling to the view that community-wide health care itself is not
a charitable activity. These states require some additional showing
of a contribution to society, such as charity care, before conferring
an exemption.29
The leading judicial exposition of the latter position is the Utah
Supreme Court's opinion in Utah County v. Intermountain Health
Care, Inc. 30 This decision spawned a rash of cases in which state
officials challenged the exempt status of nonprofit hospitals; how-
ever, none of these revocation efforts prevailed in state court.31
Nevertheless, challenges continue. Most recently, the attorney gen-
Defining "Charitable" in the Context of State Property Tax Exemption for Nonprofit Nursing
Homes, 34 ST. Louis U. LJ. 1109 (1990). The most striking example is a 1986 Maryland
case that denied exemption to a Maryland HMO despite the fact that the HMO had un-
restricted membership and, at the time of the case, served approximately 60,000 Maryland
residents. Montgomery County v. Group Health Ass'n, 517 A.2d 1076 (Md. 1986). See also
In re Pittsburgh NMR Inst., 577 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990) (diagnostic clinic
denied exemption solely on grounds that the Institute failed to prove its donation of a 'sub-
stantial' portion of its services). Compare Geisinger Health Plan, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656
(1991) (HMO with unlimited membership except for about 11 percent of applicants deemed
unhealthy entitled to federal exemption because it "promotes health" for broad class of the
community even though it treats no charity patients).
29. Rammell & Parsons, supra note 27, at 74. In addition to Utah, Pennsylvania is the
most notable jurisdiction, whose caselaw is described in infra note 31. See generally, Hall &
Colombo I, supra note 12, at 325 n.63; Simpson & Strum, supra note 27.
30. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985). See analysis supra note 2.
31. Callaway Community Hosp. Ass'n v. Craighead, 759 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988); Downtown Hosp. Ass'n. v. Tenn. State Bd. of Equalization, 760 S.W. 2d 954 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1988); Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc. v. Burlington, 566 A.2d 1352 (Vt. 1989). See
generally, NORTH CAROLINA CTR. FOR PUB. POL'Y RESEARCH, COMPARING THE PER-
FORMANCE OF FOR-PROFIT AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS IN NORTH CAROLINA 159-
66 (1989); Jay Greene, Governmental Units Challenge Not-for-profits' Tax Exemption, 17
MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 4, 1987 at 67; Terese Hudson, Not-for-Profit Hospitals Fight Tax-
Exempt Challenges, HosP., Oct. 20, 1990, at 32-37; Robert Pear, Tax Exemptions of Non-
profit Hospitals Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at Al, col. 2.
Pennsylvania appears to be the only state other than Utah with a legal climate hostile to
hospital tax exemption, although its precedents are presently in conflict. In West Allegheny
Hosp. v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review, 455 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 1982), the
court upheld a hospital's exemption despite its low level of charity care. The same court,
however, subsequently ruled that an organization providing administrative support to hospi-
tals does not earn the exemption where the organization does not have an "open-admission"
policy and fals to prove that it "provides its services without regard to the health care facil-
ity's ability to pay." Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth, 487 A.2d 1306, 1316
(Pa. 1985). Following this apparent inconsistency, one Pennsylvania trial court upheld a
hospital's tax exemption, St. Luke's Hosp. v. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, No. 88-C-2691 (Pa.
Ct. Cm. Pl., Lehigh Co., April 19, 1990), while another revoked the exemption. School Dist.
v. Hamot Medical Center, No. 138-A-1989 (Pa. Ct. Cm. Pl., Erie Co., May 18, 1990), aff'd,
1319 C.C. 1990 and 1320 C.D. 1990 (Pa Commw. Ct. 1992). Hamot Medical Ctr., however,
presented unusually strong facts, with the hospital in question failing to maintain an open
admissions policy of any kind, transferring earnings to for-profit subsidiaries, and paying
executives excessive compensation. Nevertheless, the most recent Pennsylvania court deci-
('Vol. 2:1
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eral of Texas sued in state court to revoke the exemption of Meth-
odist Hospital of Houston;32 this is apparently the first case in
which tax exemption has been challenged by state officials other
than tax authorities, and may be a harbinger of the future.33 Re-
consideration of tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals has also been
on the legislative agenda in more than a dozen states recently,
although no significant legislative changes have been enacted.34
To summarize, federal law exempts nonprofit hospitals without
regard to charity care, although the current position of the IRS ap-
pears to be that a typical acute care hospital must maintain an open
emergency room and treat Medicare patients in order to qualify for
exemption. Most states follow the "promotion of health" standard
of federal law in granting exemptions to nonprofit hospitals,
although a few states cling to some kind of charity care standard.
With respect to nonhospital health care services, some subsidization
of services for people unable to pay appears to be a prerequisite to
exemption both at the federal and state levels, despite the lip service
paid to the "promotion of health" standard.
III. THE NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS:
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
Simple coincidence does not explain why state challenges to and
federal rumblings about hospital tax exemption both began in the
mid-1980's. Throughout the early and middle part of that decade, a
torrent of press reports and articles on "patient dumping" chroni-
cled the plight of the indigent patient refused emergency room
sion denied an exemption to a diagnostic clinic solely on the grounds of inadequate charity
care. In Re Pittsburgh NMR Inst., 557 A.2d 220, 224 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
Taxing authorities in Pittsburgh were successful in obtaining increased revenues from the
Presbyterian-University Hospital without revoking its exemption, when it agreed to pay $11.
million over 10 years for city services. Telephone Interview with Dan Pelligrini, City Attor-
ney, City of Pittsburgh, Aug. 17, 1988. See also Michele L. Robinson, Via Donation or Tax,
Cities Want More Revenues, HosP., March 20, 1989, at 55. A number of other hospitals have
agreed to pay settlements in exemption-challenge cases, and Allegheny County tax authori-
ties continue their challenges to exemption for hospitals in the Pittsburgh area. David Burda,
Pa Files More Challenges to Tax Exemption, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Feb. 18, 1991, at 2; Leigh
Page, Pa. Hospitals Facing Fights over Tax-Exempt Status, AM. MED. NEWS, July 22, 1991,
at 1, 31.
32. State v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., No. 494,212 (126th J. Dist., Travis County, Tex. filed
Nov. 26, 1990). See Gary Taylor, Charity Begins in Court? Hospital Sued in Novel Lawsuit,
NAT'L. L.J., Feb. 18, 1991, at 3, col. 1.
33. Taylor, supra note 32, at 3, col. 1.
34. NORTH CAROLINA CENTER FOR PuB. POL'y RESEARCH, supra note 31, at 159-66




treatment at private hospitals due to lack of insurance or other abil-
ity to pay.35 Estimates are that 37 million Americans have no
health insurance, a 30% increase from 1979.36 Therefore, the naive
premise behind the earlier liberalization of hospital exemption stan-
dards that the lack of demand for indigent care rendered the charity
standard anachronistic has been proven woefully wrong. Concur-
rent with these developments, federal and state fiscal crises have
made the estimated $8 billion in tax revenue foregone 37 a tempting
target for financing some or all of the gap in health care coverage.38
In 1990, Representative Edward R. Roybal, Chairman of the
House Select Committee on Aging, conducted hearings on the sub-
ject of charity care provided by nonprofit hospitals. 39 The result of
these hearings was a bill originally introduced in 1990, then reintro-
duced in 1991, to provide specific standards of charity care that hos-
pitals must meet in order to receive a federal tax exemption. 40
Shortly after the re-introduction of the Roybal Bill, another legisla-
tive proposal dealing with standards for hospital exemption was in-
troduced by Representative Brian Donnelly.41 These proposals
have now taken center stage in the national debate over the charita-
ble status of nonprofit hospitals.
35. See EQUAL ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE: PATIENT DUMPING, H.R. Rep. No. 531,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988); Geraldine Dalleck & Judith Waxman, Patient Dumping: A
Crisis in Emergency Medical Care for the Indigent, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1413 (1986);
Mark A. Hall, The Unlikely Case in Favor of Patient Dumping, 28 JURIMETRICS J. 389
(1988); David U. Himmelstein, et al., Patient Transfers: Medical Practices as Social Triage, 74
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 494 (1984); Robert L. Schiff, Transfers to a Public Hospital, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 552, 553 (1986); Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing Patient Dumping: Sharpen-
ing COBRA 's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1186 (1986).
36. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HEALTH INSURANCE AND THE UNIN-
SURED: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS 3 (June, 1988).
37. Roybal Hearings, supra note 15, at 60.
38. In the words of Rep. Roybal, "With the.. .value of hospital.. .tax-exempt status
estimated at over $8 billion annually, we must once again target this vital Federal resource at
providing hospital care to uninsured, underserved, and disadvantaged Americans.... [U]ntil
this nation commits itself to a national health policy protecting all Americans, it cannot
afford to lose the $8 billion in protection that the value [sic] tax-exempt status potentially
offers." 137 CONG. REC. E396 (1991).
39. Roybal Hearings, supra note 15.
40. 137 CONG. REc. E395-97 (1991).
41. 137 CONG. REc. E896 (1991). Representative Donnelly plans to retire at the end of
his current term (Representative Roybal also plans to retire). Adam Clymer, Citing Rise in
Frustration, Dozens of Lawmakers Quit, N.Y. TIMES, April 5, 1992 at 1.
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A. Substantive Tests for Exemption
1. The Roybal Bill
The Roybal Bill imposes two basic requirements for exemption.
First, the hospital must maintain an "open door" policy toward
Medicare and Medicaid patients, serving a "reasonable number" of
such patients.42 The second, and far more elaborate, test requires
that the hospital earn its exemption by spending specific amounts
on unreimbursed charity care and community benefits. This part of
the bill starts with a two-part general statement that a hospital can
be exempt only if it "provides in a nondiscriminatory manner suffi-
cient qualified charity care and provides sufficient qualified commu-"
nity benefits."43 Sufficient qualified charity care is then defined as
unreimbursed charity care costs equal to 50% or more of the value
of the hospital's tax-exempt status for the taxable year."
Charity care costs for these purposes are the aggregate of the
hospital's costs of providing services to persons unable to pay in
whole or in part, the hospital's costs of services charged off as bad
debts, the excess of a hospital's costs of services to Medicaid pa-
tients over the reimbursement for such services, and the costs of
preventive health and health promotion programs targeted to mem-
bers of the community who are medically underserved and disad-
vantaged.4" This latter category applies, however, only "if the
community has too few charity care patients in need of charity hos-
pital care."'
The value of exempt status to the hospital is determined by a
42. Roybal Bill, supra note 5, § 2(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(1)(A)). The bill
contains no specific guidelines on the number of Medicare patients deemed "reasonable,"
stating simply that the determination shall be made under all the facts and circumstances. Id.
(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(A)).
43. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(nXl)(B)).
44. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(B)(i)(I)).
45. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(B)(ii)). Because the bill speaks in terms of the
costs of these services, it is clear that hospitals would no longer be allowed to continue valu-
ing these services based on their standard charges, which is the present accounting practice.
This raises the complexity of identifying the costs of isolated services when most hospital
costs are shared across many services. A marginal cost measure is probably not intended,
although conceivable to justify. More likely, the bill intends an average cost measure. The
standard methodology is to start with the normal hospital charges for the services in question
and discount them by a hospital-wide average cost-to-charge ratio. Thus, if a hospital would
have charged $1 million for its uncompensated care, and if its overall cost-to-charge ratio is
75 percent, it would be credited with $750,000 of charity care. However, for specialized
health promotion outreach programs that traditionally have no charge base to start from, it
may be necessary to measure the costs more directly. This technical deficiency presumably




national average computation, taking into account federal, state and
local taxes, rather than on a hospital-specific basis.47 Nevertheless,
the bill permits the IRS to apply a different percentage (higher or
lower than the national average) to a particular hospital based upon
facts and circumstances that indicate that the national percentage is
inappropriate.4 8 Moreover, it requires that the value of the exemp-
tion be measured in a fashion that results in no more than 25% of
currently-exempt hospitals losing their exemption.49
Sufficient qualified community benefits exist under the bill if the
associated costs equal or exceed 35% of the value of the hospital's
exemption (computed in the manner just described). 50  Eligible
community benefit services are those "not otherwise provided by hos-
pitals which are not exempt from tax." Hospitals may also count
charity care costs in excess of the 50% threshold.5' The remaining
15% of exemption value is automatically attributed to unspecified
community benefits, which hospitals must report annually.52 Over-
all, therefore, the bill aims to require hospitals to justify the full
value of their tax exemptions by spending at least 50% of this value
in the form of unreimbursed charity care, 35% on quantifiable com-
munity benefits, and 15% presumptively credited for intangibles.
2. The Donnelly Bill
Under the Donnelly Bill, a hospital will be exempt only if it
meets three separate criteria. First, the hospital must operate an
"open" emergency room that is, provide emergency care to all per-
sons regardless of ability to pay.53 Second, the hospital must have a
47. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(ii)). Specifically, the bill requires the IRS
to compute the percentage of gross revenues of all tax-exempt hospitals that equals the esti-
mated federal, state and local tax revenues foregone as a result of exemption. This percentage
is then applied to the gross revenues of the hospital in question to determine the "value of the
exemption" for that specific hospital. Finally, the bill directs the IRS to implement a meth-
odology for estimating foregone federal, state and local tax revenues as a result of exemption,
and to report back to Congress on any changes the IRS feels are desirable in the bill's defini-
tion of the value of an exemption.
48. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)).
49. Id.
50. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(B)(i)(IH)).
51. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(B)(iii)(II)).
52. Id. § 2(b)(proposing new I.R.C. § 6033(e)(5)). It is anticipated that Congress will
use this reporting information to determine whether the presumption should continue that
these unspecified benefits in fact exist. Telephone Interview with Gary A. Christopherson,
Former Director, Health Legislation, House Select Committee on Aging (Oct. 11, 1990 &
Jan. 7, 1991).
53. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(A)(i)). The bill
also states that if a particular hospital receives certain sanctions for engaging in "patient
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provider agreement under which it treats Medicaid patients. 4 Fi-
nally, the hospital must meet one of five alternative tests of "com-
munity benefit." The hospital must (1) be a sole community
hospital;5" (2) treat a disproportionate number of Medicaid or low-
income Medicare patients;56 (3) maintain a "disproportionate pa-
tient percentage" as defined under Medicare that is within one stan-
dard deviation of the mean for all hospitals in the geographic area; 7
(4) devote at least 5% of its gross revenues to providing charity
care;58 or (5) devote at least 10% of its gross revenues to designated
outpatient services, such as operating a community health center or
drug rehabilitation center in a medically underserved area. 9 Un-
like the Roybal Bill, the 5% charity care standard in the Donnelly
Bill does not include bad debts or Medicare/Medicaid contractual
allowances, but it does include money contributed by a hospital to a
state charity care pool.' According to Rep. Donnelly, a charity
dumping" as prohibited under the Medicare statute (transferring emergency patients to other
hospitals for economic reasons), it shall be considered as not operating an open emergency
room. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(A)(ii)). Exceptions to the open emergency
room requirement are made for situations in which the emergency room is deemed unneces-
sary or duplicative by state health authorities, or when the hospital is a specialty hospital as
defined in § 1886(dXl)(B) of the Social Security Act. Id. (proposing new I.R.C.
§ 501(n)(2XA)(iv)(II)). Such hospitals include psychiatric, rehabilitation, and children's hos-
pitals, or other hospitals with an average inpatient state of greater than 25 days. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ww(d)(1)(B).
54. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(B)).
55. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(nX2XC)(i)). "Sole community hospital" is defined
by reference to the Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act. Social Security Act
§ 1886(d)(5)(D)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(DXiii). This provision states that a sole com-
munity hospital is one located more than 35 road miles from another hospital, or that because
of other factors is the sole source of inpatient hospital services reasonably available to individ-
uals in the geographic area, or is an "essential access community hospital" as defined in
§ 1819 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-4(i)(1).
56. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(ii))(sufficient to
qualify for the Medicare "disproportionate share adjustment" described infra note 57).
57. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(1)(C)(iii)). The disproportionate patient per-
centage is the sum of two fractions. The first fraction has in the denominator total Medicare
patient days and in the numerator the patient days attributable to low-income Medicare pa-
tients (those who receive cash benefits under the Social Security Supplemental Security In-
come (SSI) program). The second fraction divides total patient days attributable to Medicaid
patients by total patient days. 137 CONG. REc. E897 (1991) (remarks of Rep. Donnelly).
These computations are designed to detect when a hospital is committing more than its "fair
share" of resources to the extra costs of treating low-income patients, and is used to calculate
whether a hospital will receive a disproportionate share payment adjustment under Medicare
to offset these expenses. For further detail, see infra text accompanying notes 80-85.
58. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(iv)).
59. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(v)). The IRS may designate other such
services.
60. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(iv)). "Contractual allowances" refers to
the difference between a hospital's normal charge for a given service and the amount the
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care patient is one from whom the hospital expected no payment at
the time the service was rendered.6'
3. Commentary on the Substantive Exemption Standards
a. The Roybal Bill
The substantive standard of the Roybal Bill is based on a hospi-
tal "earning" its exemption with charity care or other community
benefits whose value equals the exemption. In essence, the bill
adopts the "relief of government burden" or "quid-pro-quo" theory
that often has been advanced as a justification for exemption, a the-
oretical approach that we previously have commented on favora-
bly. 62 This theory posits that exemption is warranted because, in
the absence of the exemption, government would have to pay for
services rendered by the exempt entity.63 From a theoretical per-
spective, it is hard to fault a requirement that hospitals annually
earn their exemption, other than the general complaint, discussed
more fully below, that such a system is more logically administered
as a direct government subsidy through an agency other than the
IRS.64 However, the Roybal Bill in its actual implementation of
this theory proposes a grossly inadequate computation of charity
care.
The basic flaw of the Roybal Bill is its failure to measure
whether a nonprofit hospital earns its exemption by comparing its
hospital actually receives from Medicare/Medicaid for the service, which is less than the
normal charge.
61. In the words of Rep. Donnelly,
For example, if a hospital provides care to an individual and at the time of provid-
ing the services had no expectation of receiving payment, the cost of that care could
be considered charity care for purposes of the standard. Consequently, the hospi-
ta's motives in providing the care are relevant under this standard. Factors which
would have sufficient probative value to establish a charitable intent under such a
"no expectation" standard would include the income of the patient, whether or not
the patient was eligible for a public assistance program, whether or not the hospital
billed the patient for the care provided, and how aggressively and over what period
of time the hospital sought payment.
137 CONG. REc. E897 (199 1)(statement of Rep. Donnelly).
62. See Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 350-54. In the taxonomy of that article, an
exemption so earned is deserved, it is precisely proportionate to the size of the subsidy, and it
has historical and intuitive support. Our chief criticism of this theory is that, to the extent it
is limited to charity care, it is not the exclusive basis for exemption, and to the extent it
extends to other community benefits, there is no reliable mechanism to determine which are
deserving.
63. Id. at 345-46.
64. See infra text accompanying notes 110-113 (noting that a direct subsidy or a system
under which the government itself treats the medically indigent is overall easier to administer
and better able to account for varying needs in different locales).
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level of uncompensated care to uncompensated care levels provided
by for-profit hospitals. As we previously have observed, even for-
profit hospitals "give away" a substantial dollar amount of services
in the form of bad debts.6" In fact, in proportionate terms, for-
profit hospitals are closing in on nonprofit levels of uncompensated
care and may have overtaken them. 6 The federal government's
General Accounting Office (GAO), for example, estimated that for
1988, investor-owned hospitals devoted 5.2% of revenues to uncom-
pensated care as compared with 4.8% of nonprofit hospitals'
revenues.
67
If exempt hospitals do not have proportionately more uncom-
pensated care than for-profit hospitals, then the exempt hospitals in
fact are not relieving any government burden and do not deserve
exemption under this theory. Put another way, if exempt hospitals
are providing no greater uncompensated care than for-profits, pre-
sumably all nonprofits could convert to a proprietary status over-
night and the government would suffer no detriment in the amount
of charity care provided, plus it would have $8 billion in additional
revenue to boot.68 Therefore, nonprofit hospitals earn their exemp-
tion only with uncompensated care that exceeds in proportionate
terms that provided by their for-profit counterparts.69 Indeed, this
is precisely the rationale adopted by the Roybal Bill when it insists
that community benefit services not count toward the 35% quota if
they are customarily provided by for-profit hospitals; 70 why the bill
65. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 346.
66. Id. at 348. A recent analysis by the Prospective Payment Review Commission,
based on 1984-1989 data from AHA surveys, found that nonprofits spent 4.6% of their total
expenses on uncompensated patient care, as compared with 4.3% of forprofit hospital ex-
penses (unpublished data of the Prospective Payment Review Commission).
67. UNrrED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NONPROFIT HOSPITALS: BET-
TER STANDARDS NEEDED FOR EXEMPTION 12 (1990) [hereinafter, GAO REPORT] (based on
AHA survey data).
68. See Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 346.
69. In other words, if for profits typically provide four percent of their care for free,
nonprofits could count toward meeting their charity care requirement only the amounts of
uncompensated care that exceed four percent of their operations. See David Hyman, The
Conundrum of Charitability: Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J. L. & MED.
327, 331 (1990); Arnold Relman, Are Voluntary Hospitals Caring for the Poor?, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1198, 1199 (1988) (tax exemption would be "troubling" and "hard to justify" if
nonprofits are not doing more for the poor than for-profits).
70. Roybal Bill, supra note 5, § 2(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(nX2)(B)(iii)(I)). The
reason for this limitation is that many of these services are simply sound business practices.
Services like health promotion fairs, health screening, child-birth classes and the like are
effective marketing devices, introducing the public to the hospital in the hope that many will
return for acute care. Thus, it makes no sense to credit nonprofit hospitals with the same
1992]
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failed to use this same approach in the basic charity care standard is
unclear, but a major error.
Taken as a whole, the Roybal Bill in effect creates a form of tax
credit for the charity care and community benefit services that non-
profit hospitals provide. The bill attempts to measure the actual tax
liability of hospitals, compares that with the cost of charity care and
community benefit services, and then assesses the difference as an
excise tax. Thinking in terms of a tax credit is a helpful way to
expose the fundamental policy choice: whether the services being
counted are deserving of a tax subsidy. Allowing nonprofit hospi-
tals to take a direct, dollar-for-dollar tax credit for their bad debts
and "contractual adjustments" is clearly not sensible tax policy,
particularly when these same expenses are borne by for-profit hospi-
tals to approximately the same degree without any such credit.
Addressing this flaw requires some means of measuring only
true "charity" care: that is, the free care provided by nonprofit hos-
pitals that exceeds the proportion provided by proprietary institu-
tions. The Donnelly Bill attempts to do this, but because it defines
charity care by reference to the hospital's intent when the patient is
admitted, it requires difficult if not unworkable subjective determi-
nations of altruistic motives.7" A more administratively feasible
alternative would be to measure the actual proportion of for-profit
uncompensated care and subtract this from nonprofit uncompen-
sated care percentage in order to arrive at a true charity care figure,
using the assumption that for-profits do not render any free care
simply out of the goodness of their hearts. This approach, however,
creates the additional complexity of deciding whether the for-profit
benchmark should be local or national, and how often it should be
measured. Therefore, perhaps the most satisfactory compromise
would be to set a fiat legislative presumption that the first 5% of
gross revenues devoted to uncompensated care does not count.72
revenue shortfalls that for-profit hospitals suffer simply as an economic decision to generate
more business or as a cost-benefit assessment of the worth of pursuing bad debts.
71. See supra note 61. For a general discussion of the difficulties entailed in separated
altruistic from self-interested motivation, see Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Dona-
tive Theory of the Charitable Tax Exemption, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379 (1992) [hereinafter Hall
& Colombo II].
72. See, e.g. GAO REPORT, supra note 67 (noting that in 1988, proprietary hospitals on
average gave away 5.2% of their revenues in the form of bad debts and charity care). More-
over, Medicaid shortfalls and other so-called "contractual adjustments" should not be
counted since they are suffered approximately to the same extent by for-profit hospitals. See
also Chisago Health Services v. Commissioner of Revenue, 462 N.W.2d 386, 391 (Minn.
1990) ("The fact that CHS discounts its market fees in accepting Medicare and Medicaid
payments does not, by itself, constitute the extension of charity to the patients involved....
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In addition to its flawed application of the quid-pro-quo theory
of the exemption, the Roybal Bill has technical flaws relating to
matters of administrative enforcement. Primarily, 3 the attempt to
use a nationwide percentage of revenues as the measure of the value
of the tax exemption to an individual hospital is at least unfair,
probably unwise, and in the context of the bill, a nightmare. For
example, the largest component of the value of the federal exemp-
tion is the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds.7 4 This subsidy varies
widely across hospitals depending entirely on how much and how
recently each one has raised capital through bond financing. Two
hospitals of exactly the same size and income, but one with rela-
tively new, bond-financed facilities and the second with relatively
old, debt-free facilities, would gain dramatically different benefits
from the exemption but would be assessed the same burden by this
legislation. In addition, the rates and the types of taxes imposed by
states vary just as dramatically. While virtually every state has
some kind of property tax, rates vary tremendously." Attempting
to estimate the value of exemption on a national level and then im-
posing that estimate on an individual hospital, therefore, is sheer
nonsense. If the underlying rationale of making each hospital pay
back the value of its exemption is to have any meaning, the wide
variation in state and local tax burdens must be taken into account.
In fact, the Roybal Bill implicitly recognizes these problems. It
allows the IRS to adjust the national percentage up or down as facts
and circumstances demand. This method, however, may not be the
best to use given that all hospitals in high-tax jurisdictions are likely
to demand this adjustment, but those in low-taxed states will not.
Therefore, a less biased and more straightforward approach would
be to meet reality head-on and calculate the value of the exemption
on a hospital-specific basis. This could be done rather simply by
having each hospital file the equivalent of a federal tax return, plus
information on state and local taxes, including property tax assess-
There is little conceptual difference between these discounts and the business discounts nego-
tiated by HMO's and health insurers on behalf of their insureds with both public and private
... hospitals."); Frank A. Sloan, Property Rights in the Hospital Industry, in HEALTH CARE
IN AMERICA 103, 134 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988).
73. A secondary technical problem is the lack of definition of "costs" in calculating
uncompensated care. See supra note 45.
74. See, e.g., John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, Federal Tax Subsidies for Not-for-Profit
Hospitals, 46 TAX NoTEs 1559, 1565 (1990) ($1.7 billion, as compared with $1.6 billion for
the income tax exemption and $1.2 billion for the deductibility of charitable contributions).
75. See Henry Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on the Mar-
ket Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 71, 76 (March 1987).
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ments that many jurisdictions record on even exempt property. If
necessary, each hospital could simply be required to make a good
faith estimate of state taxes foregone, backed by certified appraisals
and audits. This would greatly relieve the burden on the IRS in
making these determinations in the first instance.
b. The Donnelly Bill
The Donnelly Bill adopts a curious mixture of charity care and
community service standards that at first glance appear to be a re-
turn to a more restrictive charity-care standard, but on closer in-
spection would codify the permissive exemption approach of the
1969 ruling with more objective criteria. The main focus of the bill
is its adoption of a flat 5% charity care requirement. On first ap-
pearance, this seems to be a return to the 1956 ruling under which
IRS agents used 5% as an operating rule of thumb to determine
sufficiency of charity care for exemption purposes.76 As a matter of
theory, such a rule is a perfectly sound legislative determination
that 5% charity care is sufficient to earn the exemption in all cases.
Such a determination provides both the industry and the IRS with a
measure of desired certainty and avoids ensnaring them in the quag-
mire of calculating an exact match for each hospital. Moreover, the
technical definition of charity care in the Donnelly Bill may avoid
some of the problems encountered in the Roybal Bill. Charity care
expenses, for example, properly exclude bad debts and contractual
adjustments; and by tying the standard to a percentage of gross rev-
enues, the bill provides a bright-line standard that does not depend
on the vagaries of state tax burdens."
76. Roybal Hearings, supra note 15, at 62-63 (statement of James J. McGovern, Associ-
ate Chief Counsel, IRS).
77. However, the charity care definition raises other problems. Unlike the Roybal Bill
which clearly states that costs are the measure of charity care and community benefit serv-
ices, the Dounelly Bill suggests that charges are the measure since it speaks in terms of devot-
ing a percentage of "gross revenues." Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § 1(a)(proposing new
I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(iv), (v)). On the other hand, when the bill sets the measure of the
excise tax penalty, it creates a contradictory inference by speaking in terms of "the cost of
charity care." Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(4)(B)(i)(II)).
The bill is also unclear as to how state rate regulation programs will affect the measure-
ment of charity care. Some states impose a hospital industry tax to create a state-wide char-
ity care pool from which hospitals may then collect based on the charity care they provide.
The bill credits hospitals with their payments into these pools without any offset for reim-
bursement they receive from these pools. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(iv)). This
might contemplate that hospitals may count both their tax payments and the actual charity
care they render, even though they are compensated from the pool-but that would be non-
sensical. More likely, the pool payments knock out the actual charity care (but not the tax
assessment). In addition, the bill fails to address the manner in which other rate regulation
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The bill makes clear, however, that the 5% charity care stan-
dard is not the sole criterion for exemption; it is only one of five
alternatives. A hospital may receive exemption for treating low-in-
come Medicare and Medicaid patients, being a sole community hos-
pital, or operating certain outpatient clinics in medically
underserved areas. Thus, the bill in essence codifies the "commu-
nity benefit" approach of the 1969 ruling while avoiding the prob-
lem of quantifying the inherently "soft" benefits often set forth by
hospitals as a justification for exemption. 8 Offering hospitals this
limited menu prevents them from endlessly rationalizing that every-
thing they do is equally deserving.
Despite the appearance of greater rigor, the Donnelly Bill con-
tains a gaping technical hole that allows any hospital to qualify for
exemption if its "disproportionate patient percentage" is within one
standard deviation of the mean for all hospitals in its geographic
area (usually, the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA)).
The disproportionate patient percentage, more appropriately
termed the "disproportionate share percentage," refers to a calcula-
states handle uncompensated care. Maryland, for instance, has no tax-funded pool; instead,
it builds into each hospital's rate base a hospital-specific measure for uncompensated care.
Michael R. Merson, Managing in Maryland, 13 HEALTH MGMT. Q 24, 25 (1991); Stewart H
Rome, Medicine and Public Policy: Let Us Look Before We Leap Again, 41 MD. L. REV. 46,
51 (1981) (article critical of data collection process). What happens to the cost of care these
hospitals render uninsured patients? One might conclude that the cost to treat uninsured
patients is included in the hospital specific measure for uncompensated care. However, like
the pooling states, these hospitals receive explicit reimbursement from the rate-setting pro-
gram, and only through other patients. On the other hand, there is fundamentally no differ-
ence between this arrangement and the manner in which unregulated hospitals fund their
charity care, which is to "cost-shift" by increasing their charges to paying patients. Finally,
the Donnelly Bill, unlike the Roybal Bill, does not allow a shortfall in the 10% community
services category to be made up through the charity care category.
78. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 378-80. Technical problems exist with these
alternative tests as well. In addition to the problems related in the text below with respect to
the disproportionate patient percentage test, the test requiring a hospital to spend 10% of its
gross revenues on outpatient clinics has the same "costs or charges?" definitional problem
noted with respect to the 5% charity care standard. Supra note 78. Whichever measure is
intended - costs or charges - the bill creates additional confusion when it requires the
hospital to "devote at least 10 percent of its gross revenues to qualified services and benefits."
Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(C)(v)). Do such "quali-
fied services" count even if the hospital receives full reimbursement? Possibly, under the bill's
language, but surely not, given the bill's rationale. If reimbursed services are not counted, it
is simply unrealistic that any hospital could devote fully ten percent of its operations to un-
reimbursed specified outpatient services, because in order for the unreimbursed portion to
reach 10 percent of the hospital's overall operations, an even larger portion of the hospital's
operation would have to be devoted to nonhospital services. Thus, to meet the 10% test, a
hospital might have to derive 40-to-50 % of its income from outpatient specialized services
(such as drug and alcohol treatment) in order to have such services of sufficient scope to
generate the requisite quantity of uncompensated outpatient care.
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tion under Medicare to compensate those hospitals that treat a dis-
proportionate number of Medicaid and low-income Medicare
patients. The theory behind this provision presumes that hospitals
treating a large number of these patients deserve extra compensa-
tion because such patients tend, on average, to be more severely
ill,7 9 and because hospitals that tend to receive a large number of
publicly insured low-income patients are probably located in areas
where they also receive a large number of uninsured patients.8 0
Any hospital with a "disproportionate share" of such patients,
which varies according to hospital size and location, receives an ex-
tra payment for their Medicare patients only.81
The Donnelly Bill uses the disproportionate share calculation in
two of the five alternative "community benefit" tests. First, it
deems that any hospital that receives a disproportionate share pay-
ment automatically satisfies the charity care requirement.8 2 The
problem with this is that a hospital could meet this standard with-
out ever treating a single uninsured person because the computation
refers entirely to Medicare and Medicaid patients. Such hospitals
are already receiving compensation through Medicare for this addi-
tional burden. Nevertheless, a rationale can be imagined for ex-
empting such hospitals if it is assumed that both a hospital's
disproportionate share percentage is a good proxy for the number of
uninsured patients and that the extra Medicare payments do not
fully compensate for these proxied costs. Both assumptions are rea-
sonable ones, although the magnitude of the effects are debatable.8 3
79. See Arnold M. Epstein et al., Do the Poor Cost More? A Multihospital Study of
Patients' Socioeconomic Status and Use of Hospital Resources, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1122
(1990).
80. See generally PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, TECHNICAL AP-
PENDIXES TO THE APRIL 1986 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 57-63 (1986); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, MEDICARE'S DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE ADJUSTMENT FOR HOSPITALS (May
1990) [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
81. PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMMISSION, TECHNICAL APPENDIXES TO
THE MARCH 1988 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES 16 (1988). The size of the payment ranges from about 3% to about 30%
of the total Medicare payments, depending on the hospital's actual disproportionate share
percentage. CBO REPORT, supra note 80.
82. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § 1(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(nX2)(C)(ii)).
83. According to a tentative simulation analysis performed by the Congressional Budget
Office, if hospitals in 1987 were paid the disproportionate share adjustment in force in 1991,
disproportionate share hospitals would have had an overall operating profit of 3.3%, as com-
pared with an overall profit margin of 4.4% for nondisproportionate share hospitals. CBO
REPORT, supra note 80, at xiii. Assuming the goal were to equalize the profit margins of
these two groups, these figures suggest that disproportionate share hospitals are still an incre-
ment away from full parity. However, given that the total amount paid as a disproportionate
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The second use of the disproportionate share calculation, which
exempts hospitals whose disproportionate share calculation is no
more than one standard deviation below the area-wide mean is more
questionable. Essentially, this tells hospitals they are exempt even if
they treat significantly fewer low-income Medicare and Medicaid
patients than the local average. Thus, the uncompensated care
proxy rationale identified above is much weaker here. Indeed, as
noted with respect to the first test, a hospital could meet this second
standard also without ever treating a single uninsured patient, and
hospitals located in comparatively affluent areas could meet the
standard without even treating very many publicly insured patients.
Presently, no agency keeps figures on the one-standard-deviation-in-
each-locality calculation, so the precise number of hospitals covered
is not known with certainty. However, estimates performed by the
American Hospital Association indicate that over three-quarters of
nonprofit hospitals would automatically qualify by virtue of this
provision, again without necessarily having to treat a single charity
case outside of the emergency room.14 Given these results, it is im-
possible to imagine a legitimate rationale for including this item in
the list of five qualifying community benefits.
While providing a Mack-truck-sized loophole for exemption of
typical acute care hospitals, the bill curiously makes it potentially
more difficult for specialty hospitals to qualify for exemption than
general hospitals. It essentially repeals an IRS 1983 ruling which
treats these two types of hospitals equally (excluding a requirement
to operate an emergency room). 5 While the Donnelly Bill contin-
ues to exempt specialty hospitals from the requirement of operating
an open emergency room,86 it does not exempt them from the five-
part alternative tests of community benefit. These hospitals virtu-
ally by definition will not be sole community hospitals under the
Medicare laws, 7 and many are unlikely to have a disproportionate
number of low-income Medicare and Medicaid patients.8 Unless
share adjustment in 1991 was estimated at $1.6 billion, it appears that an $8 billion tax sub-
sidy far exceeds what is necessary to close this differential. On the other hand, not all of the
$8 billion in tax subsidy goes to disproportionate share hospitals.
84. Fewer than 600 of the nation's approximately 3200 nonprofit hospitals would fail to
qualify under this provision. Telephone Interview with Michael Rock, Senior Associate Di-
rector, Legislative Affairs, American Hospital Association (July 25, 1991).
85. Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94. See supra note 15.
86. Donnelly Bill at § 1(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(2)(A)(iv)).
87. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
88. See supra note 57. This presumes that few specialty hospitals would market them-
selves to patients whose payors might provide less than sufficient reimbursement.
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these hospitals fall within the one-standard-deviation mark, they are
left to the 5% and 10% expenditure tests. The 10% test has little
relevance since, by virtue of their specialized nature, these hospitals
are unlikely to offer the designated outpatient services. Thus, for no
apparent reason specialized hospitals will be virtually the only hos-
pitals that will be subjected to the rigorous 5% charity care
requirement.
4. "Spillover" Effects
In addition to the problems outlined above, a closer reading of
both the Roybal and Donnelly Bills reveals that in their zeal to rein-
in exemption for typical acute-care hospitals, each creates certain
"spillover" effects that threaten the exempt status for certain spe-
cialized hospitals which virtually everyone would agree are entitled
to exemption and other exempt institutions, such as universities,
that operate hospitals. In its opening language, the Roybal Bill
states that "An organization which [sic] operates a hospital shall
not be exempt from tax under this section unless" the relevant sub-
stantive standards are met for "each hospital" operated by the en-
tity seeking exemption. 9 The Donnelly Bill similarly states that
"an organization shall be exempt from tax.., only if no substantial
part of its activities consists of operating a nonqualified hospital."9
The language cited for each bill has two puzzling effects. First, it
prohibits hospitals from using other portions of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
to justify their exemption. Historically, charity care and commu-
nity benefit are merely the residual I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) categories to
which hospitals have been relegated in their search for exemption
when they have been unable to qualify under the enumerated cate-
gories of religious, educational, or scientific institutions. Under cur-
rent law, many hospitals may not need to rely on these residual
categories if they serve as teaching and research institutions at pri-
vate universities.91 Each bill appears to eliminate this route to ex-
89. Roybal Bill, supra note 5, § 1(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(1)).
90. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(1)Xemphasis
added).
91. Although we know of no specific IRS rulings dealing with university hospitals, a
number of rulings have held that school-related organizations are exempt as educational insti-
tutions. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 58-194, 1958-1 C.B. 240 (cafeteria operated for convenience of
students and faculty); Rev. Rul. 63-235, 1963-2 C.B. 210 (law review); Rev. Rul. 66-103,
1966-1 C.B. 134 (organization providing low interest loans to students). See also, Squire v.
Student Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (1951) (university book store exempt). It is likely that
this issue simply has not yet arisen in the context of university-affiliated or research hospitals
because hospitals themselves generally have been exempt.
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emption by virtue of their requirements that every hospital seeking
exemption must meet the residual criteria, rather than imposing its
regimen only on those hospitals that fail to qualify through the stan-
dard categories.92
Second, the quoted language in each bill removes the exemption
from any nonhospital institution if the institution operates a hospi-
tal that does not meet the bill's substantive tests for exemption.93
Therefore, an entire university or church could lose its exemption if
its hospital did not meet the bill's requirements, even though the
rest of the institution pursues other qualifying activities. The ra-
tionale for structuring the bills in this fashion is not readily appar-
ent, and seems to serve no useful purpose. 94
B. Enforcement Provisions.
1. Differences in the Bills.
In addition to the substantive standards for exemption, each bill
provides new sanctions for violations.95 The Roybal Bill would im-
92. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(1)); Roybal Bill,
supra note 5, § 2(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(1)).
93. Actually, the Donnelly Bill provides a sort of de minimis exception, since it states
that an entity loses exemption only if operation of a "nonqualified" hospital constitutes a
"substantial" part of the entity's activities. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new
I.RC. § 501 (n)(1)). The Roybal Bill contains no such de minimis language, and is quite
specific in requiring each "hospital" operated by an entity to meet the substantive require-
ments of the bill. Roybal Bill, supra note 5, § 2(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501 (n)(1)(A) and
(B)).
94. Other than perhaps as a penalty to encourage compliance, the fact that an otherwise
exempt institution operates a nonexempt hospital should have no more bearing on its exemp-
tion than the operation of any other unrelated business. In general, operation of unrelated
businesses does not jeopardize an entity's exempt status, although profits from such a busi-
ness are subject to the Code's unrelated business income tax. See supra note 7. The authors,
at least, find somewhat incongruous the notion that the tax system would permit (to take one
famous example) New York University to operate a macaroni factory but forbid it to operate
a for profit hospital. On the other hand, a University that faced revocation of its exempt
status because of failures related to its hospital operation might well take its compliance
duties more seriously than if loss of exemption was confined to the hospital operation.
95. Each bill also imposes new reporting requirements for exempt hospitals. The
Roybal bill requires an exempt hospital to report annually (1) the number of Medi-
care/Medicaid patients treated and whether such a number is reasonable for the hospital and
was provided on a nondiscriminatory basis, (2) the total number of patients for the year, (3)
the total number of charity care patients for the year and whether such treatment was done
on a nondiscriminatory basis, (4) the hospital's aggregate charity care costs, (5) the hospital's
aggregate community benefit costs, and (6) the community benefits provided by the hospital
that are not customarily provided by non-exempt hospitals. Royba Bill, supra note 5, at
§ 2(b)(proposing new I.R.C. § 6033(3)). The Roybal Bill also directs the IRS to establish
rules for exempting from reporting requirements certain hospitals that consistently meet the
proposed tests for exemption - apparently, the bill envisions the reporting requirement ap-
plying to "marginal" exemption cases only. Id. § 2(c). In addition, each exempt hospital is
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pose a new excise tax on any hospital that fails to meet the charity
care/community benefit standards in a given year.96 The tax is the
amount by which the hospital's actual charity care/community ben-
efit expenditures fall short of the bill's requirements (i.e., the differ-
ence between the actual expenditures and 85% of the "value of the
exemption" for the hospital computed as described above).97 In a
novel move, the amounts collected by the IRS under the new excise
tax must be paid over to the state in which the offending hospital
operates. States may use this tax to fund state-provided charity
care.98 The bill specifically states that, except in "egregious" cases,
required to furnish to the IRS a statement from the state Medicare/Medicaid administrator
that (a) either the hospital participates in the Medicare/Medicaid program or, in cases where
such participation is limited by contract, that the hospital made a "reasonable effort" to be
awarded such a contract but did not get one and (b) that to the best of the official's knowl-
edge, the hospital is expected to meet the requirements of the proposed bill in the following
year. Id. § 2(b). Presumably, this statement would cover all parts of the proposed exemption
standards, i.e., that the hospital would meet the Medicare participation, charity care and
community benefit expenditure standards. State officials are also given the opportunity to
comment on an application for exempt status. The bill requires that an application include
the same kind of statement discussed above from state officials that the bill requires in a
hospital's annual return. Id. § 4.
The Donnelly Bill similarly imposes a number of new reporting requirements. It requires
a hospital to report to the IRS (1) the nature and costs of charity care for the year;, (2) the
nature and costs of other "community benefit" services; (3) whether the hospital receives
disproportionate share payments under Medicare/Medicaid programs, the geographic area
for determining such adjustments, the hospital's disproportionate patient percentage, and its
Medicaid inpatient utilization rate; and (4) whether the hospital is a specialty hospital as
defined in § 1886(d)(1)(B) of the Social Security Act. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5,
§ l(b)(1)(proposing a new I.R.C. § 6033(e)). The Donnelly Bill does not provide for state
comment on a hospital's exemption application, but does require the IRS to notify a state
when a hospital either becomes or ceases to be exempt under the standards of the bill, and
requires the Department of Health and Human Services to inform the IRS of hospitals that
terminate Medicare/Medicaid provider agreements.
The information reporting requirements of either bill undoubtedly will be an additional
headache for hospital administrators, but should pose no major problems once definitional
issues (i.e., the definition and allocation of costs in order to calculate charity care) are re-
solved. Since most exempt organizations already file an informational return on Form 990
(I.R.C § 6033 requires information returns by exempt organizations), the additional report-
ing requirements will not necessitate radically new filing procedures.
96. The tax would not apply to the first year a hospital failed to meet the exemption
standards; instead, the bill requires the IRS to publish a notice of these "first time offenders"
in the Federal Register. Roybal Bill, supra note 5, (proposing new I.R.C. § 4913(a)(3)). It is
unclear whether this one-year grace period is a one-time benefit for each hospital, or whether
a hospital could strategically time its expenditures to repeatedly exploit it by bouncing in and
out of compliance. See Joint Committee on Taxation Staff Description On Proposals and Is-
sues Relating to the Tax-Exempt Status of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, reprinted in DAILY TAX
REP., July 10, 1991, at L-l, L-14 [hereinafter Joint Committee Report].
97. Roybal Bill, supra note 5, § 3(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 4913).




this excise tax should supplant revocation of exemption as the pri-
mary enforcement tool.
In contrast, the Donnelly Bill continues to rely on revocation of
exempt status as the primary enforcement mechanism along with a
provision that permits reinstatement of exempt status after two
years.99 The bill, however, provides one alternative sanction: if a
hospital fails the exemption test because it does not meet one of the
five alternative "community benefit" expenditure standards dis-
cussed above, the hospital may elect to pay a penalty that generally
equals the difference between 10% of the hospital's gross revenues
and the cost of charity care provided by the hospital."°° The Don-
nelly Bill also makes clear that a hospital that fails the new exemp-
tion standards will not be treated as a charitable entity for purposes
of receiving tax-deductible charitable contributions or issuing tax-
exempt debt, a point left open in the Roybal Bill. 10 1 However, the
Donnelly Bill is not clear about whether and when these ancillary
benefits of exemption status would be lost in the event a nonqualify-
ing hospital elects to pay the penalty tax.
2. Commentary on Enforcement Provisions
Currently the only enforcement tool available to the IRS to po-
lice most exempt organizations is revocation of the exemption. The
IRS previously has complained of the unwieldy task of policing ex-
empt organizations with only the "death penalty" at its disposal. In
1989, for example, a special task force formed to study the tax
code's civil penalties concluded that revocation of exempt status
was a penalty "of doubtful utility except in major abuse situa-
tions."10 2 The problem, of course, is that revocation of exempt sta-
tus can effectively destroy an exempt entity, and often results in
punishing the beneficiaries of an organization rather than its man-
agers.10 3 Thus, revocation of exemption is equivalent to dropping a
nuclear bomb: it is a drastic step with such sweeping consequences
99. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(4)).
100. Id. (proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(4)(B)). However, for the first year of noncompli-
ance, the penalty is only 10% of the calculated amount (that is, 10% of the difference be-
tween 10% of the hospital's gross revenues for the year and costs of charity care).
Curiously, the bill does not credit the hospital with the costs of qualified community
benefit (outpatient) services it in fact provides.
101. Id. § 1(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(3)).
102. REPORT ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES BY THE ExEcuTIvE TASK FORCE, COMMIS-
SIONER'S PENALTY STUDY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (1989), reprinted in DAILY TAX




that the IRS rarely invokes it."° Indeed, in the last decade only one
hospital has lost its exemption."0 5 The task force, therefore, con-
cluded that excise tax penalties similar to those currently imposed
on private foundations for violations of exemption standards would
permit the IRS to police exempt organizations more effectively.1 "6
Therefore, the Roybal Bill, which utilizes an excise tax as the pri-
mary enforcement tool, appears preferable to the approach of the
Donnelly Bill, which still relies on revocation of exemption as the
primary enforcement alternative, albeit with an excise tax alterna-
tive in certain cases.10 7 Nevertheless, even the Roybal sanction
104. See Leslie G. Espinoza, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for
Informed Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 671 n. 315 (1991).
105. Roybal Hearings, supra note 15, at 175 (statement of James J. McGovern, assistant
chief counsel, IRS).
106. Id. These excise taxes imposed on private foundations are contained in I.R.C.
§§ 4940-4948 (1991). In general, the Code distinguishes between charitable private founda-
tions and "public charities." The classic example of a private foundation is a charitable trust
funded by contributions from a single family (e.g., the Ford family) which in turn makes
contributions to other charities. Throughout the late 1950's and early 1960's, tax policy ana-
lysts were increasingly concerned that the general retention of control over family funds rep-
resented by the private foundation device created a potential for self-dealing between the
foundation and the managers/founders. As a result, Congress in the 1969 Tax Reform Act
enacted a comprehensive system to control the potential for private foundation abuse, relying
largely on excise taxes to enforce prohibitions against self-dealing, improper investing and the
like. See generally, Hall & Colombo II, supra note 71 at 1448; Council on Foundations,
Private Foundations and the 1969 Tax Reform Act, in 4 U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Research
Papers Sponsored by the Committee on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs 1557 (1977). In
addition, private foundations are subject to lower contribution limits under I.R.C. § 170 (per-
mitting tax-deductible contributions) than their public charity counterparts. I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(1) (individuals may contribute 50% of adjusted gross income to public charities, but
only 30% to private foundations).
The lack of alternative sanctions for enforcement of exemption standards for public chari-
ties is particularly striking when compared to the private foundation excise tax scheme. For
example, one of the primary requirements of exempt status under § 501(c)(3) is that an ex-
empt organization not be guilty of "private inurement" - that is, the managers of the entity
cannot siphon off the economic benefit of exemption through, for example, unreasonably high
salaries, low-interest loans, free cars, etc. See Colombo, supra note 19, at 482-84. In the case
of private foundations, inurement-type issues are generally controlled through an imposition
of an excise tax on acts of "self dealing." I.R.C. § 4941. This section imposes a tax on the
manager or founder of the foundation, not the entity itself, on any act of self-dealing, which
generally are defined as transactions between the foundation and its managers or founders at
below-market rates. I.R.C § 4941(d). Thus in the public charity arena, acts of self-dealing
can be punished only by invoking the private inurement prohibition and revoking exempt
status; in the private foundation arena, the IRS can turn to the excise tax sanction before
considering revocation. See generally, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 102, at S-100 to S-
102.
107. The Donnelly Bill's sanction system also suffers from a potential "ping-pong" effect,
that is, hospitals bouncing in and out of exempt status depending on whether they meet the
bill's substantive exemption criteria. The Donnelly Bill states that a hospital that fails the
exemption criteria of the bill may reapply for exempt status after two years, akin to the
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could be improved. The sanction gives no incentive for a hospital to
comply with the charity care and community benefit expenditure
standards. If a hospital fails the test, it simply pays the difference to
the federal government. In the meantime, the hospital remains ex-
empt and thus gets to keep the 15% difference between the exemp-
tion standard and the estimated exemption value as well as the
associated benefits of exemption (the ability to attract tax-deducti-
ble contributions and access to the tax-exempt bond market). It is
easy to imagine a hospital consciously choosing to pay the excise
tax in lieu of the hassles of providing charity care in order to main-
tain the other benefits of exemption. 108 Accordingly, some kind of
"second-tier" tax would appear necessary to make hospitals actu-
ally render the desired services. In fact, current excise tax sanctions
used to police the private foundation area contain a penalty tax that
encourages both remedial action and future compliance."
NFL's "lifetime ban" for player drug-use violations that permits a player to petition for read-
mission after one year. Donnelly Bill, supra note 5, § l(a)(proposing new I.R.C. § 501(n)(4)).
Using excise taxes to enforce exemption standards avoids this ping-pong effect since the entity
technically remains exempt.
The Donnelly Bill's alternative excise tax sanction for a hospital's failure to meet one of
the five tests of community benefit expenditures also appears to suffer from a technical flaw.
As noted above, the bill provides for an excise tax of 10% of the difference between 10% of
the hospital's gross revenues and its charity care costs in the first year of noncompliance, and
100% of the difference in each subsequent year "with respect to the same failure." See supra
note 99. That is, the 100% penalty is applicable only to successive years of noncompliance; if
the hospital meets the five criteria test in a subsequent year, then the 10% penalty kicks back
in. The Treasury observed that this system could encourage hospitals to engage in "creative
cost allocation," by trying to push charity care costs for a two-year period into a single ac-
counting year, and paying the 10% tax the next year. Assume, for example, that a hospital's
charity care costs average 4% over a two-year period. If the hospital fails to meet any of the
other five "community benefit" criteria, the hospital will suffer a 10% penalty in year 1, and a
100% penalty in year 2. If, on the other hand, the hospital can through accounting devices
compress part of its year 2 care into year one, so that, for example, the charity care percent-
ages are now 5% in year I and 3% in year 2, the hospital will pay no tax at all in year 1, and
only a 10% tax in year 2. See Joint Committee Report, supra note 96, at L-l, L-14.
108. The Roybal Bill does provide for the assessment of a higher tax "because of unusual
circumstances," but limits this to one percent of the hospital's gross receipts for the year,
Roybal Bill, supra note 5, § 2(a), which in many cases would be less than the entire charity
care burden. The bill also allows for revocation of exemption in "egregious" cases, so per-
haps repeat offenders at some point would suffer loss of exempt status. Id § 3 (proposing new
I.R.C. § 4913(c)). Nevertheless, ifa hospital consistently misses the 85% target by, say, 1%
per year, is this "egregious" conduct?
109. For example, the excise tax on acts of self-dealing between a private foundation and
its founders/managers start at 5%, but failure to remedy the act of self-dealing results in a
200% tax. I.R.C. § 4941.
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IV. HEALTH POLICY, TAX POLICY AND THE
CONGRESS.
This section explores more broadly several questions raised by
these proposed bills that lie at the intersection of health policy and
tax policy. First, it examines whether legislation of this type,
which essentially addresses health policy concerns by manipulating
the tax system, is the best solution to the problems of access to
health care. Then, taking tax reform as a second-best option, it
questions whether these bills are consistent with wise tax policy.
A. Is Tax Legislation the Best Route?
Both the Roybal and Donnelly Bills are aimed in a broad sense
at ensuring that the government receives adequate return for the
benefit of tax exemption by specifically tying exemption to expendi-
tures for charity care, treatment of Medicare/Medicaid patients,
operation of open emergency rooms and the like. Both, therefore,
are premised on the recognition that exemption is a substantial gov-
ernment subsidy that needs to be more closely monitored.110 If one
accepts the subsidy premise, however,"' then the natural question
is why use a tax subsidy at all? Currently, both federal and state
governments provide direct subsidies for health care in the form of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs, and states have begun to sub-
sidize care for uninsured patients through hospital rate regula-
tion." 2 A direct subsidy can accommodate widely varying needs
for charity care over time and among different localities, taking into
account the particular state's generosity in Medicaid reimburse-
110. In his statement opening the hearings before the House Select Committee on Aging,
Rep. Roybal stated, "... until this Nation commits itself to a national health policy protecting
all Americans, [we] cannot afford to lose the $8 billion in [foregone federal revenues] that the
[Federal] tax-exempt status potentially offers." Roybal Hearings, supra note 15, at 2 (state-
ment of Rep. Roybal). Rep. Donnelly echoed this sentiment in introducing his bill. "Mr.
Speaker, the fundamental basis under which Congress exempts organizations from taxation is
the belief that those organization will relieve a governmental burden... My legislation, conse-
quently, imposes some realistic requirements on hospitals if they wish to enjoy the generous
benefits which the Government provides." 137 CONG. REc. E896 (statement of Rep.
Donnelly).
111. As we previously have observed, characterization of the exemption as a tax subsidy
is not universally adopted by tax commentators. In one of the classic articles on tax exemp-
tion, Boris Bittker and George Rahdert argued that exemption was not a subsidy at all, but
merely a natural consequence of the inability of charitable institutions to accurately measure
income. Boris Bittker & George Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). For reasons stated in our previous work,
we disagree. See Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 313 n.12, 385-87.
112. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 358, n. 176. See also Michael A. Dowell, State
Health Insurance Programs for the Uninsured Poor, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 141 (1989).
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ment, the presence of government-owned hospitals, and other dem-
ographic factors." 3 A direct subsidy also is just as simple to
administer, especially in the case of health care where administra-
tive machinery already exists.1 4 Government could also treat the
indigent directly through the public hospital system, as is already
the case with Veterans Administration hospitals, the Indian Health
Service, and various state and municipal hospitals. Such direct
treatment for needed services is surely at least as efficient as indirect
coaxing through tax exemption standards.
Even if the tax subsidy route were preferable, another serious
flaw in both the federal and state legislative efforts is that they are
aimed exclusively at hospitals. Both the Roybal and Donnelly Bills
fail to address issues of tax exemption that arise with respect to
HMOs, physician group practices, various outpatient clinics, nurs-
ing homes, pharmacies and the myriad other parts of the nation's
health care system. Surely these are just as necessary to a sound
health care delivery system for the poor as is hospital care. Ad-
dressing hospital tax exemption without considering the health care
system as a system invites continued irrational treatment of these
other important parts of health care delivery. Unfortunately,
neither the states nor the federal government appear much inter-
ested in fashioning an exemption standard that makes sense across
the range of health care providers.
Our view, therefore, is that the best way to address issues re-
garding tax exemption is to do so within the confines of a broad re-
examination of health care financing policy as a whole. 15 Whether
such a broad re-examination will occur given the current political
climate, however, is questionable. Washington, D.C. is currently
deluged with health care reform proposals, and the House Ways
and Means Committee, which is considering these hospital exemp-
tion bills, is presently at the eye of this storm. Democrats, who are
desperately searching for domestic issues for the fall, 1992 presiden-
tial campaign, see health care reform as a potentially powerful
113. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 358.
114. See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 100-102
(1985)(observing that administrative complexity is not a function of the method of subsidy);
Alvin C. Warren, Jr. et al., Property Tax Exemptions for Charitable, Educational Religious
and Governmental Institutions in Connecticut, 4 CONN. L. REv. 181, 295-298 (1971) (appar-
ent simplicity of the tax subsidy is illusory since it is purchased at the price of a sacrifice in
monitoring and accuracy).
115. However, we would support Congress addressing the more technical parts of the
legislation, relating to enforcement provisions and possibly including some measures concern-
ing private inurement and unrelated business income, as pure tax legislation.
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"wedge" issue in the 1992 election." 6 Rep. Pete Stark, a Democrat
from California who chairs the House Ways and Means Health
Subcommittee, has held an extensive series of hearings over the past
two years on health care insurance and cost containment. As a con-
sequence of this considerable interest, when the Democratically-
controlled House Ways and Means Committee convened its hear-
ings on this tax legislation in July, 1991, the primary focus became
the politics of health care financing reform. Several Democratic
members lambasted the witnesses from Health and Human Services
and Treasury, who opposed the core substantive requirements of
both bills, for the administration's lack of leadership on health care
reform issues. Therefore, it appears highly unlikely given the Com-
mittee's present mood that the exemption legislation will proceed
ahead of or apart from some larger package of health care reform
measures.11 7 Such measures, however, will not receive serious con-
sideration until after the 1992 election, and even then a final com-
promise proposal could take years to finalize.
B. Tax Legislation as the Second-Best Choice
Because we are pessimistic about the chances for fundamental
health care financing reform in the near term, we accept the propo-
sition that some tax-based legislation may be the next best alterna-
tive for dealing at least incrementally with the issue of access to
health care. Because nonprofit hospitals are presently widely dis-
tributed across the country and, realistically, there will always be
demand for hospital charity care, government should take advan-
tage of the charitable tax exemption to pursue, even at the margin,
pressing health policy objectives.
Equally clear is the fact that pursuing such incremental change
will require legislative intervention. Although the IRS has recently
announced its intention to toughen enforcement of current stan-
116. Senate majority leader Sen. George Mitchell has spearheaded a year-long effort by
key congressional leaders to fashion a viable comprehensive reform bill. See Susan B. Gar-
land, Suddenly the Health Care Crisis Has Democrats Feeling Robust, Bus. WK., June 10,
1991, at 47.
117. Even if the bills were to be considered more as a matter of tax policy, the debate
appears likely to be heavily influenced by stakeholder interests. The highly politicized hear-
ings were dominated by hospital interest groups and contained precious few witnesses with a
disinterested, analytical perspective on the issues. There were 11 witnesses representing non-
profit hospital interests, five representing various federal government agencies, two represent-
ing state and local governments, one representing health care lawyers, and only one
representing consumers of health care. Academic tax theorists were not to be found at the
witness table. The Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals, Hearings Before the House Committee on
Ways and Means, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. D880 (1991).
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dards, which is reminiscent of the politics that led to the 1969 ruling
where the IRS was prompted by Congressional inquiry to dramati-
cally alter its conception of hospitals' charitable status118, the
agency will apparently focus only on such marginal issues as main-
taining an open emergency room and avoiding unseemly proprie-
tary ventures. Moreover, even if the policy environment were
primed for regulatory change, we question whether a revenue col-
lecting agency should act on matters that require health policy ex-
pertise. Therefore, a good case exists for legislative intervention.
Nevertheless, we have serious difficulties with both bills. At the
outset, we wonder whether either of the bills actually will increase
charity care even incrementally. On balance, both bills as presently
drafted will have only a marginal effect on hospital exemption. The
Roybal Bill makes this explicit by providing that the charity care
standard will be set at whatever level is necessary to ensure that
75% of all presently tax-exempt hospitals remain exempt, even with
no change in behavior. The Donnelly Bill has similarly limited
aims, although they are hidden in the five-part community benefit
test. By permitting continued exemption for hospitals whose dis-
proportionate patient percentage falls within one standard deviation
of the mean for the geographic area, the bill allows most nonprofit
hospitals to continue to conduct business as usual. '1 9 We question
whether a multiple-page statute that undoubtedly will require a
hundred-page regulatory effort, with multiple new reporting re-
quirements and maintenance of lists by both the IRS and HHS, is
really an efficient use of resources to obtain such limited goals, espe-
cially in the already-too-complicated Internal Revenue Code.
Therefore, rather than address this issue from the framework of
the particular legislative proposals that are pending, we will tackle
the problem head-on by analyzing the basis for charitable tax ex-
emption from the ground up. The rationale that underlies the 1969
ruling, taken from the law of charitable trusts, is that merely pro-
viding hospital services to a broad group of paying patients is a suf-
ficient public benefit to deserve the exemption.1 20  However,
everyone who now considers the issue, even the hospital industry,
concedes that something more is required.1 21 The debate really
118. See Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 320 n.43 (referring to Rev. Rul. 69-545 and
its timing in the 1969 legislative calendar). See also Fox & Schaffer, supra note 10.
119. See Joint Committee Report, supra note 96, at L-13.
120. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 321-22, 332-34.
121. Id. at 344-45.
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turns on what that "something else" is that hospitals should
provide.
Charity care is certainly a sufficient "extra", but the grounds are
weak for making it the sole basis for exemption. Historically, char-
ity care has never been the exclusive basis for exemption, although
it has always been a primary touchstone. 122 However, for charity
care even to be a sufficient test of exemption, hospitals must demon-
strate that they provide proportionately more uncompensated care
than their for-profit counterparts, in an increment that equals or
exceeds the value of the exemption. Neither bill quite achieves this
measure, but a combination of their provisions is capable of doing
so. The Roybal bill compares the cost of charity care with the value
of the exemption, but it fails to take account of the for-profit base-
line. The Donnelly bill corrects this defect, but abandons any com-
parison with the value of the exemption. We suggest a combination
of the two concepts. If administrative complexities create problems,
then perhaps adoption of a legislative presumption of five percent of
gross revenues (the current approach of the Donnelly Bill) would be
justified.
A good number of nonprofit hospitals probably would fail to
meet this more rigorous approach to charity care as a sufficient
standard for exemption. If encouraging additional charity care
were the only policy consideration, then perhaps any new legisla-
tion should be limited to this demanding quid-pro-quo test. We be-
lieve, however, that any new legislation should also consider
whether some general theory apart from the demanding quid-pro-
quo approach could support exemption.
The traditional response of the hospital industry has been that
various "community benefits" they provide also warrant exemption.
This position suffers from two major weaknesses. First, it is unclear
how one determines whether these "community benefits" in fact ex-
ist. For instance, some commentators argue that community bene-
fits should be determined primarily by a "process-based" standard
with no eye to the actual outcomes of this process.1 23 This ap-
proach enmeshes Congress in a metaphysical "values" debate over
the comparative performance of for-profit hospitals. Ample re-
search has demonstrated no significant, consistent advantage of
122. Id. at 358-63.
123. J. David Seay & Robert M. Sigmond, Community Benefit Standards for Hospitals:
Perceptions and Performance, FRONTIERS OF HEALTH SERVICES MGMT., Spr. 1989, at 4.
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nonprofit health care over for-profit care.124 Moreover, determining
which particular services warrant special subsidy is more a matter
of health policy expertise than of revenue collection techniques, and
thus is not properly housed in the Treasury Department. 25
Second, a major problem exists with measuring the quantity of
community benefits against the value of the exemption. Even hospi-
tals concede that treating paying patients alone is insufficient, so
surely they must admit that only the unreimbursed costs of these
unspecified community benefits should be the basis for exemption, a
measure that is readily quantified as the Roybal bill in fact pro-
poses. Hospitals, however, try to duck the inevitable result of the
quantification trap by citing unspecified, intangible community ben-
efits that result from rendering hospital care to paying patients in a
nonprofit setting. The result, therefore, is that we lack any objec-
tive, reliable mechanism for determining what aspects of nonprofit
hospital care are inherently more beneficial than for-profit care, suf-
ficient to justify an $8 billion subsidy. While the Donnelly bill at-
tempts to meet these two objections, and in some ways does provide
additional objectivity, it continues to delegate to the IRS and HHS
the core policy issue of what other community benefits are deserv-
ing of a social subsidy.
To address this problem, in two prior articles we proposed a
"market in altruism" as an alternative mechanism for making this
substantive policy determination.126 We maintain that the proper
way to demonstrate true community benefit, of sufficient propor-
tions to merit a tax subsidy, is through the ability to solicit substan-
tial donative support from the public at large. Thus, if contributors
find the services of a particular hospital so worthy and in need of
support that they donate at least one third of the organization's rev-
enues, then a strong case exists for conferring an additional, shadow
subsidy through the tax system. This market-like mechanism
makes the difficult policy judgments automatically by allowing peo-
ple to "vote" with their contributions. The donative theory thus
provides a workable means for circumscribing which entities pro-
124. Id. at 5-7. See also BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE
99-110 (1991).
125. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 10, at 277-78 (criticizing IRS's role in setting health
policy).
126. Hall & Colombo I, supra note 12, at 389-410; Hall & Colombo II, supra note 71; see
generally, Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1579, 1623-
25 (summarizing the donative theory).
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vide services beyond charity care that should count toward justify-
ing charitable status.
C. Conclusion
If either of the current federal legislative proposals ultimately
becomes law, state efforts to attack exemption of nonprofit hospitals
probably will die out. This almost certainly will be the result of the
Roybal bill, since hospitals could now point to an official determina-
tion of their having fully earned their entire exemption through
charity care and community benefit expenditures. If these federal
efforts fail, however, nonprofit hospitals will still face challenges to
exempt status from state taxing and other authorities, as well as
more stringent interpretation of existing federal exemption stan-
dards by a politically-sensitive IRS. Open emergency rooms and
full participation in Medicare/Medicaid programs appear headed to
becoming substantive requirements for federal exemption of general
acute care hospitals. Specialty hospitals may find the relative gener-
osity of Rev. Rul. 83-157 a distant memory, as the IRS strives for
more quantifiable expressions of "community benefit." Meanwhile,
nonhospital health care providers will be left to the current exemp-
tion quagmire. Although there is much to be applauded in these
initiatives to toughen exemption standards (and even more to be nit-
picked), the issue of hospital exemption is best resolved in the con-
text of a thorough review and revision of national policy regarding
health care delivery.
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